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Introduction
Between January 1990 and June 2013, there were 1676 resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly on which votes were taken. 1 Of these resolutions, 744 did not relate to a particular country, 932 mentioned a country, 646 criticized a country, and 272 praised a country. Table 1 shows the distribution of the resolutions by country (the most prominently appearing 26 countries). 2 There are 480 resolutions in table 1 involving Israel, either directly or in relation to neighboring countries and populations. Of the resolutions in which Israel is involved, 422 or 88 percent criticize Israel, either explicitly or implicitly. Criticisms are varied and include accusations of human rights violations, although Israel is also included in criticism more generally applied to a number of countries for refusal to participate in anti-nuclear proliferation. 3
1 The sessions of the United Nations General Assembly begin annually in September. Votes up to June 2013 were thus during the 67 th session that began in September 2012. Many resolutions pass by acclamation (Hug 2012) . Such resolutions often set out visions for a better future, as for example described in "We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century" (Kofi Annan 2000) and "Building a Better Future for All" (Ban Ki-moon 2013) . Included in this category are resolutions such as those setting out the Millennium Development Goals, which announced targets for improvements in development indicators in low-income countries (United Nations General Assembly 2000; United Nations Millennium Project 2005). Resolutions on which no vote was taken also relate to procedural matters such as financial and budgetary aspects of the United Nations, rules of procedure concerning languages, and appointment of temporary staff. 2 The numbers in table 1 add to more than the total number of resolutions because some resolutions relate to more than one country. 3 The number of 422 resolutions in table 1 in which Israel is criticized is based on a narrow criterion of criticism. The number of resolutions that can be counted as criticizing Israel increases substantially when broader criteria of criticism are applied. The following is a list of 10 categories of resolutions that do not explicitly name but implicitly criticize Israel: Financing for the United Nations Relief and Following Israel (422) in table 1 in being criticized are South Africa (59), the United States of America (39), North Korea (38), Palestine (29), Iraq (22) and Iran (22) . South Africa appears because of Apartheid policies at the beginning of the data period.
The feature of table 1 is the asymmetry whereby Israel is involved in 65 percent of all resolutions criticizing a country whereas no other country appears in more than 10 percent of resolutions. Our objective is to explain the focus of attention -and the focus of criticismon Israel in table 1.
An explanation that might be proposed is bias in a context of historical discrimination: just as Jews over the centuries have been subjected to adverse discrimination through antisemitism, so the recreated Jewish state might be subject to adverse discrimination through the "new antisemitism." Yet, as we shall note, given the identity of the countries voting to criticize Israel, the criticism cannot be explained as a continuation of a tradition of results in an addition of 128 resolutions in which Israel is criticized. We include in our categorization "Nuclear Weapon States," which is a source of criticism for China, France, Great Britain, the Russian Federation and the United States. 4 Discrimination against the state of Israel has been described as the "new antisemitism." See, for example, Forster and Epstein (1974) and Judaken (2008) .
A suggested explanation for table 1 could be that there is no bias and that Israel should deservedly be criticized in 65 percent of the resolutions over the data period. We show, however, using comparative data sources, that the focus of criticism on Israel is inconsistent with events during the data period.
With neither traditional antisemitism nor comparative data explaining the focus of attention on Israel in table 1, there is a puzzle to be resolved. We propose an explanation for the voting record in table 1 based on the theory of identity-based expressive behavior (Hillman 2010) . The theory describes behavior that provides utility through expression of identity. 5 The identity expressed need not be true identity. 6 Voting in the United Nations General Assembly is expressive because resolutions are non-binding and thus do not oblige actions. Voting is usually in blocs. A bloc composed of autocracies and "weak democracies" (meaning that elections take place but the rule of law is not assured, allowing a ruler, as in autocracies, to persist in office over time) has an automatic majority and is therefore decisive in determining majority-voting outcomes. 7 5 Expressive utility resolves the "paradox of voting" that, for non-decisive voters, the time and other costs of voting exceed the material benefits (see Brennan and Hamlin 2000 , Engelen 2006 , Hillman 2010 , Hamlin and Jennings 2011 , and Brennan and Brooks 2013 . The identity-based theory of expressive behavior (Hillman 2010) proposes that, through the low-cost activities of voting and rhetoric, individuals express an identity to themselves or to others. See also Glazer (2008) on "voting to anger and to please others." For other perspectives on identity, see Akerlof and Kranton (2010) . 6 Tullock (1971) , for example, described individuals who vote contrary to their true identity of being uncharitable in expressively supporting income redistribution with the knowledge that their single vote will not be decisive.
7 Voting blocs in the United Nations are long-established. See Hovet (1960) , Iida (1988) , and Kim and Russett (1996) . On bloc-voting in the United Nations Human Rights Council, see Hug and Lukács (2014) .
Against this background, we propose that the focus on Israel in table 1 is explained by decoy voting. Our model describes Israel as a decoy or Schelling focal point (Schelling 1978) for criticism. Autocratic rulers and governments require repression for regime security but benefit expressively by portraying themselves as benevolent and not as imposing themselves on their people. The autocratic rulers and governments would lose esteem if criticized in United Nations resolutions. Decoy voting distracts attention from the acts of repression required by autocratic rulers and governments for regime security. 8 We set out the model of decoy voting in section 2. In section 3 we use comparative quantitative criteria to confirm that Israel is subject to discrimination in United Nations voting. We also compare discrimination through decoy voting with discrimination based on traditional prejudice. Section 4 provides concluding remarks.
A theory of decoy voting

Background to the theory: patters of UN voting
The voting in blocs in the United Nations is akin to voting by political parties. The voting blocs are present in the resolutions in which the state of Israel is criticized. Table 1 shows that the average majority in a vote involving Israel is 87.4 percent. A review of the data on voting on the resolutions reveals that this majority is an average of dichotomous voting outcomes. In some 20 percent of resolutions, at least 40 governments support Israel or abstain.
In the other 80 percent of resolutions, there are large supermajorities in votes against Israel, with support for Israel confined to a small number of governments (a voting bloc usually composed of Australia, Canada, the United States, Israel itself, and Pacific island states -the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, and Palau). A majority in reso-lutions criticizing Israel is a foregone conclusion. The only question is which of the dichotomous outcomes arises, which depends on voting by the European bloc. 9 A bloc that has been known as the "Third World" consistently votes against Israel, as does an Arab or Muslim bloc that has in general been part of the "Third World" coalition.
"Third World" countries are autocracies, or are "weak democracies". Our decoy-voting theory does not distinguish between autocracies and "weak democracies": both consistently vote against Israel in the United Nations and in both cases rulers have an interest in justifying persistence in office. 10 The Arab or Muslim bloc consists of autocracies. 11 The bloc regards Israel as an illegitimate state and consistently votes to criticize Israel. 12 9 Appendix 1 shows voting by countries on representative resolutions of the category of resolutions in which there are large supermajorities in votes against Israel.
10 On "weak democracies", see Carothers (2002) , who refers to a "Gray Zone" from which few true functioning democracies emerged.
11 On democracy and Arab or Muslim countries, see for example Fish (2002) , Borooah and Paldam (2007) , and Potrafke (2012 Potrafke ( , 2013 13 An explanation other than a tradition of prejudice is therefore required to explain the persistent "Third World" voting against Israel.
Expressive behavior as decoy voting
With resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly non-binding, and with voting also visible rather than anonymous, voting on the resolutions can be regarded as expressive.
Through expressive voting, countries signal identity, or display sought attributes. Signalling also takes place and identity is displayed in debate and rhetoric. More generally, Rowley (2000) described the self-attributed paternalistic identity of the "strong men" of countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Martin (2006) described the selfproclaimed "loving care of the fatherly leader" of North Korea.
Criticism in United Nations resolutions of autocratic rulers and governments would result in loss of esteem (Brennan and Pettit 2004) . At home, the autocratic governments can suppress criticism. Suppression of criticism is likewise an objective in the United Nations, where portrayal of a benevolent identity is therefore sought. Benevolent identity is counter to the necessities of regime security, which require autocratic rulers and government to be non-compromising and non-benevolent. 16 Display of benevolent identity is facilitated by choosing a decoy as a Schelling focal point for criticism. The purpose of debate and voting regarding the decoy is therefore not reaching understanding or conciliation but to direct criticism and blame at the decoy. Be- 16 Autocracy is in general inconsistent with benevolent government (Easterly 2011 ) and with political compromise (Dixit, Grossman and Gul 2000) . Threats to security of autocratic rulers and governments arise when the ruling elites -often clan or tribe-based -face internal opposition. See Alesina et al. (2003) on domestic divisions or "fractionalization." Horowitz (1985) describes the impediments to democracy in clan or tribal-based societies. In describing procurement bribery and rent extraction, Gupta et al. (2001) provide evidence on military spending by autocratic governments that confront no external threat. cause of these circumstances, behavior toward the decoy in the United Nations has been described as theatrical:
"What takes place [is not] a political debate or an attempt at problem-solving. Israel is cast as the villain in [a] melodrama." 17
The model of UN voting by autocracies 2.3.1 Summary of the model
The model describes autocratic rulers as incurring expressive disutility through loss of esteem if criticized in a UN resolution and as benefitting expressively from the opportunity in the United Nations to criticize and distract attention to someone else. Autocratic rulers also benefit non-expressively or materially from regime security through repression of opposition in their home countries. 18 Repression is costly in expressive terms if there is criticism in a UN resolution and is also costly in material terms. 19 In the absence of the possibility of UN resolutions, rulers choose repression to maximize utility through regime security with no constraint of expressive disutility from criticism. UN censure resolutions introduce the possibility of criticism. The Nash equilibrium with censure resolutions is a case of the tragedy of the commons: each autocratic ruler benefits from display of benevolent identity by criticizing other autocratic rulers for the repression that each autocratic government requires for regime security. The disutility of mutual criticism is avoided by a logrolling agreement whereby autocratic governments agree not to criticize one another and choose a decoy as the unique Schelling point for criticism. The effectiveness of the decoy increases with the magnitude of the majority in decoy resolutions. The decoy is therefore chosen as the country against which the greatest majority will be obtained in decoy voting, which entails maximizing supportive decoy votes from governments outside the autocratic logrolling coalition.
The model predicts the focus of criticism on one country in table 1.
Repression without the discipline of UN criticism
We describe n autocrats as each choosing a level of repression R i to maximize utility consisting of respective expressive and material components V i and M i 20 1,... .
where
.
In (2), B i is material benefit from regime security. C i is the material or resource cost of repression. B i and C i depend on political institutions θ i . Larger θ i indicates more autocratic government. Accounting for a corner solution at zero, R i is determined from:
0, 1,.., .
In an interior solution, repression chosen from (3) increases with θ i (when the country's institutions are more autocratic).
20 See Hillman (2010) for the utility function. Additivity is assumed in (1). We do not state evident concavity and convexity assumptions. The probability P i that a censure resolution against government i comes to the vote increases with government i's repression and declines with repression by other governments:
The discipline of UN censure resolutions
In independent voting, after the country that is the subject of a resolution has been determined by (4), utility is maximized by no government voting to criticize itself and each government voting to censure any other government.
We denote by , 1 i n V  the utility of government i from being one of the (n-1) governments that votes to censure government j and by , 1 i n V   the disutility of being censured in a resolution supported by all other (n-1) governments. In the utility function (1), the expressive component of utility is: 21 The identity of a government that votes to censure -or not -also usually matters. A generalization assigns weights to utility or disutility according to the country voting for or against.
In (6), increased repression, by making a censure resolution more likely, increases the likelihood of disutility from censure and also increases the likelihood of forgoing utility by not having the opportunity to vote to censure someone else. Repression subject to the discipline of UN censure resolutions is determined by:
1,.., .
and thus is larger than without discipline of UN censure.
Logrolling and a tragedy of the commons
A logrolling agreement ends disutility from the prospect of being censured. The logrolling agreement is enforceable because voting is visible. Also, there is no incentive to defect from the majority coalition. With logrolling:
0, 1,..,
and thus 0, 1,.., ,
whereupon it follows that: 1,.., .
The condition (10) is equivalent to (3), which describes choice of repression in the absence of UN resolutions. Through logrolling, the discipline of censure resolutions is therefore avoided.
Rather than governments being subject to a censure resolution based on the probability (4), simultaneous votes can take place on n censure resolutions -one for each autocracy. In the Nash equilibrium, each of the n governments votes to censure the other (n-1) governments. The mutual censure is a case of the tragedy of the commons. The Nash equilibrium is avoided by cooperation through logrolling. 22
The decoy
In the logrolling equilibrium, the n autocratic governments have no one to criticize. A decoy chosen as a Schelling focal point restores utility from criticizing someone else. Greater majorities in decoy voting validate criticism of the decoy. The optimal decoy is the country that attracts the greatest support from outside the autocratic coalition in decoy resolutions.
The voting incentives of democracies
The above model of decoy voting refers to autocracies or governments that require repression for internal regime security. We do not present a parallel formal model of voting by democracies. We note the benefits and costs associated with participation in decoy voting by governments of democracies.
Within-UN benefits
22 Participation in logrolling requires that the expressive disutility when criticized by the other (n-1) governments be greater than the expressive utility from voting to criticize the (n-1) governments. 
Personal benefits
There are personal career benefits for a country's diplomats from expanded representation and activity within international organizations (Vaubel and Willett 1991) . 23 National politicians who can give directives for voting to UN delegations also benefit personally from congeniality in relations with autocratic regimes. 24 The personal benefits can influence decisions whether to join in decoy voting.
Ethics
The decision of a government of a democracy regarding participation in decoy voting can be influenced by ethics. A judgment can be made whether participation in decoy voting is ethical.
23 The personal benefits include invitations to social events such as countries' independence-day and national-day celebrations. 
Intimidation
Intimidation has been observed in the United Nations: 
Is there discrimination?
Decoy voting entails discrimination -against the decoy. In the absence of discrimination, there is no phenomenon or puzzle to be explained in the voting record in table 1. Discrimination is suggested impressionistically from an overview of world events over the data period. We turn to quantifiable comparative evidence and data on the issue of discrimination.
Deaths and human rights
As a comparative indicator, we use the number of battle-related fatalities as prepared by the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO). 26 We also use the Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights data (CIRI). 27 The Physical Integrity Rights Index "is an additive index constructed from the Torture, Extrajudicial Killing, Political Imprisonment, and Disappearance 25 Jean Kirkpatrick, U.S. representative to the United Nations, as quoted by Rosen (2010) . 26 We use the number of all deaths caused by hostilities in which an individual government is involved as a primary warring party.
27 See Cingranelli and Richards (2010) . We accessed the data online on 15 January 2014.
indicators. The Index ranges from 0 (no government respect for these four rights) to 8 (full government respect for these four rights)" and the new Empowerment Rights Index, which is "an additive index constructed from the Freedom of Movement, Freedom of Speech, Workers' Rights, Political Participation, and Freedom of Religion indicators. This Index ranges from 0 (no government respect for these five rights) to 14 (full government respect for these five rights)." We relate the number of deaths and human rights violations to the number of UNGA resolutions criticizing individual countries. We focus on the six countries that have been criticized most often (see Table 1 ): Israel, South Africa, the United States of America, North Korea, Iraq, and Iran. We show results averaged over the period and for individual years. Building averages over time neglects that in some countries violations and resolutions refer to a short period of time, while in others conflict is ongoing over years. Table 2 shows the results for Israel. Column (2) shows the number of resolutions criticizing Israel in an individual year. Column (3) shows the number of resolutions criticizing
Israel as a share of all resolutions criticizing a country in an individual year. Column (4)
shows the number of battle-related fatalities and column (5) the number of battle-related fatalities per resolution criticizing Israel. Columns (6) and (7) resolutions that were not tabled and therefore on which no voting took place.
Human rights violations by regimes under threat
Neumayer (2013) presents evidence that autocracies significantly increase human-rights violations when states of emergency are declared, as do, but less so, countries in which control of government is contested (anocracy), while human-rights violations do not occur in democracies. The routine repression by autocracies for regime security is not reflected in 28 On famine in North Korea in which it is estimated that between 600,000 and 2.5 million people starved to death, see Demick (2009) . The ruler of North Korea decreed markets in food illegal. Resort to the market would show lack of faith in the ability of the ruler to fulfil the responsibility of feeding the people.
resolutions in which countries are criticized in table 1, indicating -as predicted by our model -success of autocracies at avoiding UN censure resolutions. Table 10 shows voting on an accusation of "occupying territories." Discrimination is sug- Morocco nor Mauritania appears in table 1. In various other regions in the world, territory is contested without criticism in UN resolutions of countries involved. In the case of Israel, the issue of "occu- 
Discrimination through automatic repetitions of resolutions
Occupation of territory
Definition of refugees
Human-rights accusations
The resolutions in table 9 that accuse Israel of human-rights violations are repeated automatically over time without reference to particular acts. There are documented issues of bias in reports of human-rights NGOs regarding Israel. 33 UN resolutions, which are often based pied territories" is controversial. Under international law, "occupied" territory is land taken from another country. The annexation of the "west bank" by Jordan in 1950 was recognized de jure only by Britain and Pakistan. In 1967 control of the "west bank" passed to Israel and in 1988 the Kingdom of Jordan renounced claim to the "west bank." UN resolutions nonetheless take the position that the "west bank" is occupied territory. Although Egypt, which controlled Gaza up until 1967, never annexed Gaza, the same claim is made in UN resolutions with respect to Gaza. 
Awareness of discrimination
Bias in the United Nations has long been recognized (Donnelly, 1988) . Discrimination against Israel has in particular been noted. Kofi Annan, secretary-general of the United Nations, declared that countries should not hold After publicity and complaints, Human Rights Watch was obliged to dismiss a staff member in- The purpose of the resolutions is, in line with our model, not to change outcomes but to allow governments to "feel satisfaction" from having the decoy to criticize. Annan showed awareness of the decoy role in declaring that the United Nations should not use Israel to "monopolize attention." 38
Antisemitism
Given the evidence showing discrimination, does the decoy-voting model provide the appropriate or only explanation for the discrimination? An alternative explanation is the historical prejudice known as antisemitism. We have noted that "Third World" countries (Arab 
Concluding remarks
Voting in the United Nations General Assembly has been extensively studied. 40 We have added to the past studies by placing voting in the General Assembly in a context of expres-39 The literature on antisemitism in Europe includes Wistrich (1991) and Carmichael (1992) . For an overview from a behavioral perspective, see Hillman (2013) . Voigtlander and Voth (2012) report evidence of remarkable historical regional persistence in Europe of antisemitism. Gerstenfeld (2013) reports survey evidence that some 60 percent of the population of Europe harbored "extreme anti- 40 Considerable attention has been directed to investigating vote buying: see studies by Wittkopf (1973) , Kuziemko and Werker (2006 ), Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele (2008 ), Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland (2009 ), and Dreher and Sturm (2012 . General Assembly voting with regard to human rights has been studied by Boockmann and Dreher (2011) . The United States has figured prominently in conclusions about voting patterns: Voeten (2000) found that countries could be distinguished accord- were taken has revealed an extraordinary preoccupation with criticism of one country, Israel. We have confirmed that the focus on criticism of Israel reflects discrimination. To explain the discrimination, we have presented a decoy-voting model that includes autocratic vanity and esteem and a Schelling focal point for deflection of criticism. Traditional prejudice enters insofar as the decoy is chosen to maximize supermajorities in decoy resolutions.
The state of Israel has had a central role in our study -as a consequence of the revealed preoccupation with Israel in United Nations General Assembly voting. The primary conclusions of our study should not be seen, however, as being in particular about Israel.
Our conclusions are more general and concern political culture, as reflected in the presumptions and ethical standards according to which governments and politicians conduct themselves (see Hillman and Swank 2000) .
We have noted that intimidation has been observed in the United Nations. Data sources provide no basis for criticism of Canada on human-rights or other related grounds but, after reaffirmation that it would not participate in decoy voting, Canada was accusedby autocracies -of human rights violations that included child sexual exploitation, racism and discrimination against indigenous peoples, and torture and other cruelty toward its citizens. 41 ing to whether they voted consistently with or against the United States; Dreher and Jensen (2013) concluded that changes in leadership of UN members' governments tend to be accompanied by a change to voting with the United States. Among OECD countries, left-wing governments have been less likely to vote in line with the United States (Potrafke 2009 ).
41 In more detail, the accusations were, by the representative of Iran, of "violations of human rights by the Canadian government, particularly with regard to child sexual exploitation and trafficking, the We have also benefitted from the advice of anonymous referees and the editor. 
